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Much of intellectual history is punctuated by the flaring of intellectual outliers, small groups of thinkers who briefly,but decisively, influence the development of ideas, technologies, policies, or worldviews. To understand the flaring
of intellectual outliers, we use archival and interview data from the RAND Corporation after the Second World War. We
focus on five factors important to the RAND experience: (1) a belief in fundamental research as a source of practical ideas,
(2) a culture of optimistic urgency, (3) the solicitation of renegade ambition, (4) the recruitment of intellectual cronies,
and (5) the facilitation of the combinatorics of variety. To understand the subsequent decline of intellectual outliers at
RAND, we note that success yields a sense of competence, endurance in a competitive world, and the opportunity and
inclination to grow. Self-confidence, endurance, and growth produce numerous positive consequences for an organization;
but for the most part, they undermine variety. Outliers and the conditions that produce them are not favored by their
environments. Engineering solutions to this problem involve extending time and space horizons, providing false information
about the likelihoods of positive returns from exploration, buffering exploratory activities from the pressures of efficiency,
and protecting exploration from analysis by connecting it to dictates of identities.
Keywords : organizational evolution and change; organization and management theory; archival research; organizational
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Introduction
Much of intellectual history is punctuated by the brief
flaring of intellectual outliers, small groups of thinkers
who briefly, but decisively, influence the development of
ideas, technologies, policies, or worldviews. Several of
these episodes in the United States were associated with
the last 60 years. It is not hard to list examples: Bell Lab-
oratories, the Manhattan Project, the Livermore Labora-
tories, the Palo Alto Research Center of the Xerox Cor-
poration, the Applied Mathematics Panel of the Office
of Scientific Research, the Graduate School of Industrial
Administration of the Carnegie Institute of Technology,
the Statistical Research Group at Columbia University,
and several others. The organization, funding, locales,
and content of these places differ. They include think
tanks; university departments; ad hoc wartime groups;
and commercial, industrial, and government laboratories.
The flaring of intellectual outliers is a small, but pos-
sibly important, aspect of larger stories that are told
of innovation in scholarship, technology, and economic
and political systems. The search for understanding is
plagued by the apparent causal complexity. Scholars
looking through the lenses of various disciplines and
perspectives (including economics, engineering, indus-
trial and evolutionary dynamics, history, sociology, and
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technologies and places (Christensen 1997, Nelson and
Nelson 2002, Smits 1985); the coevolutionary dynam-
ics arising from university–industry relations in areas
such as chemistry (Murmann 2003) and chemical engi-
neering (Rosenberg 1998); the relations between science,
innovation, national and educational systems, and tech-
nology and industries (Ben-David 1971, Flexner 1930,
Hounshell 2000, Nelson and Nelson 2002, Noble 1977);
the relation between properties of organizations and
innovativeness (Burgelman 1992, Sørensen and Stuart
2000); trade-offs between flexibility and efficiency in
organizations (Adler et al. 1999); the influence within
certain organizations or movements of certain (creative/
outlier) individuals such as Vannevar Bush (Zachary
2004), Warren Weaver (Weaver 1970), and J. Robert
Oppenheimer (Kelly 2006); the difficulties in sustaining
creative “hot groups” (Leavitt 1996); issues of indus-
trial policy and the influence of legal frameworks (such
as patent law) on innovation (Heller and Eisenberg
1998, Sakakibara and Branstetter 2001); the influence
of organizational and institutional structures on creativ-
ity in nanotechnology and human genetics (Heinze et al.
2009); how one might try to generate a steady stream of
future intellectual and commercial innovations (Jelinek
and Schoonhoven 1990); and more general questions
concerning the sources of novelty in adaptive processes
(March 2010, Chapter 4; Padgett and Powell 2012).
Dramatically favorable novelty is made difficult to
understand by the extent to which it appears to be an
unlikely outcome of processes that ordinarily yield little
reward. Most of the time, it does not happen, even under
the most favorable circumstances. One common notion
is that favorable novelty is the unanticipated result of
unconventional combinations of elementary components
(March 2010, Chapter 4). In the ordinary course of
events, unconventional mixes do not occur; if they do
occur, the results are more likely to be negative or
minor than to be dramatically positive. As any child
who has played with a chemistry set knows, unconven-
tional mixes are much more likely to fizzle or explode
than to turn to precious metal. Numerous unhappy sur-
prises are likely to happen before a happy one occurs,
if it ever does. Although some developments are rel-
atively predictable—the processes relating to research
and development (R&D), novelty, and innovation—as
Charles Hitch observed, the novelty process “resulting
in significant scientific or technological advances is uni-
versally uncertain, with occasional happy and frequent
unhappy surprises” (Hitch 1958, p. 4).
Stories about innovation frequently touch on the role
of groups (or individuals within groups) that exhibit the
flaring of intellectual outliers, often seeing them as an
important source of ideas, but they do not generally try to
understand the dynamics of such groups. They are treated
as sources of mutations but not as comprehensible parts
of an adaptive system. One exception is Harold Leav-
itt’s study of hot groups (Leavitt 1996). He discussed
two small intellectual groups—one at the Carnegie Insti-
tute of Technology around Herbert Simon and his col-
leagues and the other at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT) around the Kurt Lewin and Douglas
McGregor groups. Despite their differences, Leavitt also
finds commonalities between them such as their young
age, democratic spirit, high productivity, and (intellec-
tually) competitive nature (Leavitt 1996, pp. 290–291).
Case studies that are made of specific instances of flaring
suffer generally from the ills of sampling on the depen-
dent variable, trying to understand success by looking
only at success. The latter problem is clearly one that we
share in this paper.
The RAND Corporation
One conspicuous example of the flaring of intellectual
outliers was the post-World War II flowering of the
RAND Corporation. RAND was one result of the post-
WWII recognition of the need for a group of scien-
tists working full time on military matters in peacetime.
Rather than simply negotiate contracts with university
faculty, the Scientific Advisory Board of the Army
Air Forces Chief of Staff decided to establish a think
tank with elements of being a pure research institution,
though initially they believed it had to be housed in an
industrial research facility to gain stability and attract
top-flight scientists to work for them. Fairly quickly,
however, the industrial setting was seen to have major
disadvantages, and RAND was constituted as a nonprofit
corporation.
Stephen Enke described the creation of the RAND
Corporation in 1946 as “something of an accident”
(Enke 1967, p. 4), but this accident can be seen as in-
volving a comprehensible evolution from wartime expe-
rience with the military uses of science to efforts to
extend that experience into peacetime by creating a
“think tank” for the United States Air Force. Aspects
of the story of RAND are told in several memoirs and
histories (Hounshell 1997, Smith 1966), and they are
debated in several memos and papers by current and
former RAND employees (Bornet 1961, Digby 2001,
Enke 1967, Goldhamer 1972, Williams 1961). The sto-
ries differ in important respects. John Williams, who
wrote several memos and notes about the nature of
RAND, observed, “Individuals often perceive clearly
what RAND is, what has given it its character, and what
made it viable in the first place; but when you combine
their images, the picture gets fuzzy” (Williams 1961,
p. 1). Despite the differences, the reports all concur in
a description of RAND as a place to which brilliant
minds were attracted, as a site of unusual intellectual
ferment, as a source of ideas that proved to be impor-
tant, and as an institution that experienced a brief flar-
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From the beginning, RAND was protected from rou-
tine requests from the military establishment, and re-
searchers were encouraged to “think outside the box.”
As a result, RAND’s mandate expanded beyond weapons
planning for the Air Force to research on decision making
and behavior under conditions of uncertainty. As RAND
hired more social scientists, its scholars did research
across a broad range of social sciences, making impor-
tant contributions to—and in many cases, inventing—
techniques and perspectives in areas such as systems
analysis, game theory, linear programming, evolutionary
biology, and studies of organizations. They established
the intellectual foundations for research on decision mak-
ing in economic organizations, including applications of
game theory to economics, organizational economics,
and evolutionary economics (Augier and March 2011).
RAND’s contributions to the field included both basic
research and applications (Digby 2001).
For about 15–20 years after the Second World War,
RAND was a monastery for engineers, physicists, math-
ematicians, economists, statisticians, and others inter-
ested in solving complex decision problems through
systematic application of mathematical tools, including
statistical decision theory and game theory. RAND oper-
ated under the premise that military problems did not
conform to disciplinary boundaries and did not often fit
a particular academic category very neatly. Frequently,
once employees began research projects, the projects
would migrate through several departments, involving
researchers of different skills. With a small base of
deviant thinkers drawn from multiple disciplines, RAND
became a major source of ideas, particularly about
systems analysis and economics; some would prove
applicable for issues in management, defense, and orga-
nizations ranging from the Pentagon to the University
of California (Enke 1967, Enthoven and Rowen 1961,
Hitch 1996, Rowen 1970, Tucker 1966).
We wish to use the RAND Corporation of the 1940s
and 1950s—and particularly the mathematics and eco-
nomics departments—as a basis for speculating about
the flaring of intellectual outliers more generally. The
focus on RAND is dictated by the practicalities of time
and space and is not meant to suggest that its con-
tributions were more noteworthy than those of others
or to ignore the idiosyncratic features of the RAND
experience. For example, RAND was broader in disci-
plinary scope than several of the other examples that are
often used in the discussions of the postwar enthusiasm
for science and the links between national security and
physics in places such as the Radiation Laboratory and
the Manhattan Project (e.g., Dennis 1994, Forman 1987).
RAND history could also be contrasted with those of
innovative developments in molecular biology and the
role of the Rockefeller Foundation in this development
(Kay 1993, 1997).
Four striking features of groups such as RAND are
(a) the unpredictability of their flowering, (b) their com-
plicated relations with their sponsors, (c) the general-
ity of their impact, and (d) the short duration of their
distinctiveness. They arise in surprising places at unan-
ticipated times, they struggle with a persistent discon-
nect between their own trajectories and the desires of
their masters, they transform thinking over a community
much broader than themselves, and they rather quickly
either disappear or decline into respectability indistin-
guishable from numerous other groups and institutions.
We can speculate about the dynamics of such epi-
sodes, why successful clusters of intellectual creativ-
ity have appeared, and why they have failed to endure.
What produces an institution or a cluster of thinkers that
becomes an intellectual outlier?1 What are the mecha-
nisms of collective novelty? Why are the periods of col-
lective intellectual creativity frequently brief? What are
the mechanisms of decline? What is the role of individu-
als, institutions, organizations, ideas, and interests in the
dynamics of change? And what other elements (chance,
luck, randomness, etc.) influence the developments?
Research Sources
The present research draws from published reports on
(and by) RAND, including annual reports, Bruce Smith’s
early institutional history (Smith 1966), RAND’s 25th
anniversary volume (RAND 1973), James Digby’s rec-
ollection of RAND personalities and alumni magazine
pieces about the early days (Digby 2001), and more
specialized discussions covering aspects of RAND’s
research on topics such as R&D (Hounshell 2000) and
game theory (Mirowski 2002).
We have also drawn on a set of archival sources, some
published (often in working paper formats), some not,
including several authors’ recollections from decades
of experiences at RAND (Enke 1967, Goldhamer
1972). Archival sources include the RAND Corporation
Archives; Harold Dwight Lasswell papers (University
of Chicago); Hans Speier papers (University at Albany,
State University of New York); Herbert Simon papers
(Carnegie Mellon University); Smithsonian’s National
Air and Space Museum Archives; W. Allen Wallis
papers (University of Rochester); and personal papers
from individuals including Joan Goldhamer, Andrew
Marshall, Malcolm Palmatier, Henry Rowen, James
Schlesinger, and Gus Shubert.
Finally, we have drawn from interviews done by our-
selves and others relevant to understanding the specifics
of RAND; these include Joan Goldhamer’s and Digby’s
collection of interviews relating to the rise of strategic
thinking at RAND (located in Goldhamer’s basement),
which includes interviews with Ed Barlow, Nathan
Leites, Henry Rowen, James Schlesinger, and Albert
Wohlstetter. We also examined a collection of interviews
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Space Museum in Washington, DC. Included in this
RAND History Project Interviews collection are inter-
views with Bruno Augenstein, Frank Collbohm, Lloyd
Shapley, Gus Shubert, Albert Wohlstetter, and others.
We also had our own extensive conversations with indi-
viduals such as Armen Alchian, Alain Enthoven, Joan
Goldhamer, Malcolm Palmatier, Henry Rowen, James
Schlesinger, Gus Shubert, and Sidney Winter.
In general, these materials are richer in analyses and
conclusions than they are in unambiguous empirical
data, but collectively, they provide a fairly clear picture
of RAND as it was experienced by people who were
there in the 1950s and early 1960s. To capture some
aspects of the RAND experience as it is reflected in these
materials, we quote often from the archival records.
Untangling the Dynamics of Flaring
Understanding the flaring of intellectual outliers may be
important, but it confronts three conspicuous complica-
tions. The first is sampling on the dependent variable.
It is essential to examine instances of intellectual flaring
in order to understand them, but it is hard to understand
episodes of flaring simply by looking at those episodes.
Whether the prior and contemporaneous factors associ-
ated with flaring are its causal determinants cannot eas-
ily be assessed by observing exclusively events where
flaring is realized. However, it is by no means obvious
what an appropriate comparison group would be in the
absence of some tentative ideas about the mechanisms
involved.
The second complication is identifying causal mech-
anisms in a probabilistic world. Flaring is a prop-
erty of many simple stochastic models of combinations.
Independent random samples will occasionally produce
extreme values that do not persist in subsequent trials.
If enough groups are formed (randomly) and produce
outcomes that are (random) draws from a distribution
of possibilities, a few will be outliers. But that status is
not indicative of any special generating properties, nor
is it likely to persist through subsequent combinations
of individuals and draws of outcomes. Thus, random
mechanisms can produce episodes of brief outliers that
observers may well attribute to more determinate causes.
The classic case with respect to individual biography is
the tendency to attribute outliers to the effects of com-
prehensible life histories or intentional choices rather
than to the capability of random reproductive combina-
tions of genes and random social combinations to gen-
erate outliers.
The third complication is distinguishing the telling of
history from its unfolding. Much of our knowledge about
the flaring of outliers comes from interviews with and
memoirs written by individuals who were present. With
these data, there is a problem distinguishing a shared
picture of reality from reality itself. The broad story
we tell is a story that is shared among almost all of
the participants. There are differences, but there is also
a broad consensus, a consensus that is shared between
early accounts and later recollections. As is well known,
however, a widely shared view can deviate substantially
from reality.
That similar novas are also conspicuous in stories
of science, art history, and literary history might sug-
gest that flaring is conspicuous as much because of its
appeal to the storytellers of history as because of its
validity as history. Individual and organizational mem-
ories are imperfect, incomplete, and sometimes dis-
torted. The telling of intellectual history achieves appeal
among academic audiences by glorifying human schol-
ars, by emphasizing dramatic events, and by confirm-
ing academic prejudices about proper organizational
arrangements. Perhaps what we have identified is some-
thing important—the predilection of human historians
for anointing clusters of human heroes as revolutionary
cadres of progress, for confirming prior prejudices, and
for inventing comprehensible fables to explain random
events—but nothing much about underlying historical
reality.
We are aware of, and suitably humbled by, those
complications. Our ambitions are therefore appropriately
modest. We wish to use some observations of the flar-
ing of intellectual outliers at RAND to generate a few
little ideas about the mechanisms involved. They are
ideas that we believe are consistent with the observa-
tions, but they clearly are not demonstrated conclusively
by what we and others have observed. They are specu-
lations about possible histories (Tetlock 1999). And as
other histories of ideas and sciences, they are neither
linear nor random. Although often evolving in phases
of paradigms, ideas have their own centrifugal and
centripetal forces. And although there are differences
between Kuhn (1970) and Merton (1938) on paradigm
development and change, both emphasize the need for
“novelty” in ways consistent with our discussion.
Speculating About the Seeds of
Success at RAND
Almost all histories of RAND, as well as histories of
other institutions credited with producing intellectual
outliers, emphasize the importance of key individuals. At
RAND that included individuals such as Armen Alchian,
Kenneth Arrow, Bernard Brodie, Daniel Ellsberg,
Stephen Enke, Alain Enthoven, Abraham Girschick,
Herbert Goldhamer, Jack Hirschleifer, Charles Hitch,
Herman Kahn, Burton Klein, Harold Lasswell, Nathan
Leites, Harry Markowitz, Margaret Mead, Oskar
Morgenstern, Richard Nelson, Roy Radner, Henry
Rowen, Thomas Schelling, James R. Schlesinger, Lloyd
Shapley, Martin Shubik, Herbert Simon, Robert Solow,
Hans Speier, John von Neumann, John Williams, Sidney
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major contributions not only to the intellectual outliers
that were generated but also to the character and culture
of the institution. Shapley (who was awarded the Nobel
Prize in Economics for work done largely at RAND)
recalled about Williams, “The personalities shape things
a lot. Williams 0 0 0was, from my point of view, the ideal
kind of department head. Under him we never had to
write a progress report 0 0 0 0 Any other bureaucrat says,
every six months you have a progress report, what have
you done, all of that. He considered it was his duty,
as head of the department, to know what his people
were doing.”2 Wohlstetter noted how personalities drove
the intellectual content, which became embedded in
the larger interdisciplinary collegial environment.3 Allen
Wallis wrote to Frank Collbohm regarding the (very)
early organization of RAND divisions, arguing for less
planning and more allowance for organic growth: “The
organization of research is something I am always reluc-
tant to plan, since it seems to me important that it grow
out of the work and the personalities.”4
Several recollections about Collbohm’s leadership,
personality, and management style credit his uncom-
promising insistence on the independence of RAND’s
research activities (from the Air Force) and his ability
to manage by raising questions that would then lead to
interdisciplinary discussions and (sometimes) collabora-
tion. Ed Barlow recalled, “[Collbohm] felt very strongly
that we must have intellectual independence from our
client—the Air Force. They should not tell us what to
study or even when to have a particular result and cer-
tainly not what the answers should be. He felt that this
independence was a core ingredient of what made us a
really worthwhile advisor and somewhat different from
other ‘think tanks’ ” (quoted in Digby 2001, p. 11). Gus
Shubert also recalled Collbohm’s down-to-earth style,
which may have contributed to the culture of respecting
ideas, not titles: “RAND was probably the only place
in the world where the President was called ‘Frank’
and the coffee man known as ‘Mr. Wilson’ 0 0 0 [Frank’s]
objective was to have RAND known by its research
and by the individuals on the research staff. Conse-
quently, Frank kept his public profile low, almost always
deferring, as we would put it, to the ‘important people
around here, those who do the research’ ” (quoted in
Digby 2001, p. 18).
Although it would be foolhardy to deny the role of
personalities in innovative thinking, broader factors also
played a role. In particular, we will focus on five themes
that are clearly echoed in the findings from studies of
research centers in nanotechnology and human genetics
in Europe and the United States carried out by Thomas
Heinze and his colleagues (Heinze and Bauer 2007;
Heinze et al. 2007, 2009). The themes are a mixture
of contextual factors and individual and organizational
factors, a mixture of things that were to some extent
choices and things that did not exhibit strong elements
of agency. For the most part, it is not possible to assign
relative weights to these factors. It is tempting to assert
that each was necessary and none was sufficient for the
flaring, but there is no way to use the present data to
make any such statement, or any other beyond observing
that each of the themes seems important in this case.
The first of the themes is a belief in fundamental
research as a source of practical ideas. The second is a
culture of optimistic urgency. The third is the solicita-
tion of renegade ambition. The fourth is the recruitment
of intellectual cronies. The fifth is the facilitation of the
combinatorics of variety. Each contributed to producing
outliers but did not ensure them. And all five elements
contributed to the community-building aspect that was
so central to the early RAND successes.
Belief in Fundamental Research as a Source of
Practical Ideas
From the start, the RAND Corporation faced a clas-
sic dilemma for scholarship—the relation between “rel-
evance” and “autonomy.” After the Second World War,
the RAND Corporation was justified by its expected
future contribution to improving strategic and tactical
thinking in the United States and particularly in the U.S.
Air Force. Enthoven and others point to the fact that
the focus affected young minds and inspired altruism in
scholars who could have gone off to publish in Econo-
metrica but felt that they wanted to “help the country.”
RAND was an arena in which the pursuit of rele-
vance conflicted with the perceived virtues of autonomy
in scholarship. There was a respect for the mission of
the institution, but much of the work was more tradi-
tional and published in academic journals (e.g., Hitch
1955, Kahn and Marshall 1953). In the catechism of
academe, scholars are expected to pursue knowledge
without regard for external demands. Ideas are to be
generated and developed by independent minds pursuing
concepts and speculations without regard to the wishes,
expectations, and sentiments of others. Knowledge is to
be sought for its own sake, or at least without explicit
consciousness of its utility. RAND was seen as deal-
ing with issues of national security, but those were very
broad indeed. As Rowen noted in his presentation to the
RAND board in 1968,
RAND has been widely thought of as being concerned
with problems of national security. This has indeed been
a principal focus of Rand’s work, but security has been
defined in an appropriately broad way. More than fif-
teen years ago at RAND, [Paul] Samuelson and [Tjalling]
Koopmans were working on basic problems of eco-
nomics, [Allen] Newell and [Oskar] Morgenstern on orga-
nization theory. [Paul] Lazarsfeld on measures of attitude,
[W. V.] Quine on social welfare, and Goldhamer and
Marshall on long-term trends in mental health. RAND has
also—almost unnoticed—produced from its very start in
the late 1940s some fundamental contributions on the the-
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initial and best-known work on social choice in a democ-
racy, Herbert Simon’s well-known papers on limited ratio-
nality in decision making, some of C. E. Lindblom’s early
work on market-like mechanisms of bargaining in plu-
ralist governments, Anthony Down’s writing on bureau-
cracy, Lloyd Shapley’s research on the mathematics of
the solution of conflicting choices among many parties,
and others. (Rowen 1968, p. 4)
Several of the early RAND leaders were vehement in
their support of research autonomy. Shubert recalled his
early perception of the RAND mission: “My perception
was that it was to be the innovator 0 0 0 the hair shirt, to the
Air Force 0 0 0 0 RAND was billed to me as an institution
which has excellent people in it who know what they’re
doing, who are free to say what they think on the basis
of the work that they’ve done, whether or not anybody
likes it. That was really just what I was looking for, so
it was with enthusiasm that I joined, and the enthusiasm
for that mission has never flagged in my mind.”5
Wohlstetter described himself as attracted to RAND
because of the ability to engage in basic research and the
“enormous latitude” at RAND early on. He was pleas-
antly surprised to find RAND publishing on issues (such
as geometry), which “didn’t seem to me to have much
directly to do with strategic bombing or anything of
that sort.”6 Another early RAND scientist, Olaf Helmer,
noted in an interview that “RAND differed very much
from other organizations that were given specific assign-
ments. There was an atmosphere at RAND which was
even freer in some respects than what you would find
at the universities.”7 Williams also noted that “[w]hile
RAND might exist without some of the things it enjoys,
without independence it doesn’t matter whether it exists”
(Williams 1961, p. 7), emphasizing that lack of indepen-
dence would compromise both objectivity and integrity.
The tension between the relevance of scholarship for
social problems and the autonomy of scholarship fills
the literature and institutions of scholarship without any
significant progress toward resolution over time (Augier
and March 2011, Chapter 10). A characteristic feature of
institutions and cultures that foster intellectual outliers
is an interpretation of history that credits fundamental
research with important contributions to solving practi-
cal problems, the adoption of an ideology that denies
the conflict and proclaims—in Abraham Flexner’s terms,
the “usefulness of useless knowledge” (Flexner 1939).
Flexner’s call for basic research was in the context of
medical education and medical schools (Flexner 1910),
and Williams (1961) explicitly linked the importance of
fundamental research at RAND to a comparison with the
medical profession. A similar call was heard in the con-
text of business schools and business education (Augier
and March 2011, Chapter 5).
Confidence in the veracity and centrality of the Flexner
epigram was characteristic of RAND, as it was of other
institutions that have exhibited intellectual outliers
(Gehani 2003, Hoddeson 1981). Reports of instances of
the usefulness of useless knowledge abound and were
frequently cited. Enthusiasts proclaimed that the work at
RAND illuminated quite important issues in the strategic
competition during the Cold War, issues ranging from
location of strategic air bases to economic effects of
thermonuclear war and beyond.8 To our knowledge, no
serious effort has ever been undertaken to estimate the
presumably small likelihood of useless knowledge being
useful or to render an unambiguous assessment of the
costs and benefits involved. The Flexner epigram about
the usefulness of useless knowledge has been accepted
(or rejected) more as an article of faith than as a proven
(or provable) proposition. This was as true at RAND as
it was at other institutions.
During the 1940s and 1950s, there was never any
doubt that RAND worked for the Air Force. However,
as Enthoven and others noted in personal conversations,
a large part of the early success was attributed to the
inclination to focus on finding out what needed to be
studied—the questions, rather than the answers (RAND
1973, p. ix). There is a problem, however, in attribut-
ing research autonomy at RAND exclusively to the
enthusiasm of individuals inhabiting RAND. The sense
of research autonomy at RAND could be attributed as
much to the culture and attitudes of the Air Force as
to the culture and attitudes at RAND. After the Sec-
ond World War, significant senior Air Force officers
were as convinced of the value of research autonomy
as were RAND researchers. Over time, the officer corps
in the Air Force drifted away from a strong support for
Flexner and his heirs, with clear effects on the ability of
RAND to maintain a pure position in favor of research
autonomy.
A Culture of Optimistic Urgency
The postwar culture of danger and hope extended
well beyond RAND, but it was particularly notable
there. RAND was created at a time in which schol-
ars were generally optimistic about science (including
social science) and about solving urgent world problems
through research and analysis. There was a real sense
of urgency—especially in the late 1940s to the early
1960s, a sense that a major war with the Soviets was a
distinct possibility.
Postwar concerns about sustaining American interna-
tional preeminence and winning the Cold War (while
avoiding a hot one) activated many academic minds.
Enthoven, for instance, recalled how he, fresh from the
MIT economics Ph.D. program, was attracted to RAND
because of the problems. Williams also felt that the dan-
gers of the world warranted his (and others’) participa-
tion. He said that as a result of the war he had become
“very much alarmed at the mass of characters that were
loose in the world and decided that there was no one
standing between me and these people except the United
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somehow participate I’d have only myself to blame if I
didn’t like the way it turned out” (Bornet 1962, p. 4).
There also was a sense of opportunity: there were
big new problems (such as intercontinental nuclear war)
inviting scientific solutions that were imaginable. Leites,
for instance, recalled,
There was a sense of the social sciences being in a
pre-Newtonian phase—comparable to the late medieval
period in physics—but that a breakthrough might be
immanent and might occur at RAND by a combination of
the following factors: (a) the mingling in research on the
great political problems of social scientists and physical
scientists; (b) the focusing on the yet unstudied subject
matter of nuclear weapons; (c) the access to highly secret
data; and (d) the possibility of effectively approaching
the top level of government.9
This optimism and urgency was expressed, in part,
by faith in the “two-way street” between working on
real problems and developing analytical frameworks
(Lindblom 1997, Simon 1986, Wallis 1980). It inspired
“altruism” in scholars who might have spent their life
in normal academia but felt compelled to try to help
develop an understanding of big national societal prob-
lems, rather than (or in addition to) contributing to
their disciplines (Weaver 1970). Scholars could work
on problems of great significance to national security
and hence to public welfare (Smith 1966). In a let-
ter to Oppenheimer regarding how to organize research
at the Institute for Advanced Studies, von Neumann
noted, “A certain contact with the strivings and prob-
lems of the world that surrounds us is desirable and
even necessary” (quoted in Rédei 2005, p. 192). In a let-
ter to Commodore Lewis Strauss (U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission) in 1946, von Neumann specifically men-
tioned wartime experiences as affecting his own increas-
ing interest in problems outside his home discipline:
“The war introduced me to great parts of mathematical
physics and applied mathematics which I had neglected
before” (quoted in Rédei 2005, p. 240).
The great puzzle about the urgency that enveloped
RAND was the way it was twisted from a short-time
horizon effort, applying clearly relevant knowledge to
immediate problems to a long-time horizon to discover
new directions. There is adequate research to support
the idea that urgency normally shortens time horizons
rather than lengthens them; but somehow, in this case, to
some extent at least, long-time horizons became fashion-
able. Wohlstetter noted the lack of immediate deadlines:
“One of the things that I found attractive at RAND was
that you didn’t have an urgent deadline. It was not like
a government problem, where you have to get some-
thing out in two weeks.”10 In some mysterious way, an
urgent pressure for relevance became an urgent pressure
for fundamental research and ideas that were relevant in
the long term. It is as though a string quartet stranded in
a winter snowstorm decided urgently to compose a new
fugue rather than start shoveling.
Solicitation of Renegade Ambition
RAND was not initially a leading intellectual center
that would automatically attract mainstream stars of aca-
demic circles. In retrospect, RAND became home to
outstanding academic scientists, including Nobel Prize
winners, but they generally came to the corporation
before they were stars. Among the scholars who were
at RAND and later received the Nobel Prize were
Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, Ronald Coase, John
Harsanyi, John Nash, Lloyd Shapley, Herbert Simon,
Vernon Smith, Robert Solow, and Oliver Williamson.
Some of these stars gravitated later, as stars normally do,
to institutional centers of conventional academic excel-
lence, but they came early to RAND and have gener-
ally acknowledged the substantial influence of RAND
on their career and ideas.
Arrow, for instance, explicitly described how he, look-
ing for a research topic for a dissertation, encountered
Helmer at RAND:
I went to RAND, and luck was with me. There was
a philosopher there 0 0 0Olaf Helmer, whom I had actu-
ally met earlier 0 0 0 0 They hired him through a very
complicated chain of circumstances, involving Bertrand
Russell 0 0 0 0 Helmer translated [Alfred] Tarski’s elemen-
tary textbook on logic and I proof-read it 0 0 0 0 When we
were at RAND together, Helmer remarked that there was
something that bothered him about game theory or about
its applications. We wanted to talk about the US, the
USSR, and Western Europe as players, but they are not
like people, in what sense do they have utility functions?
How can we apply game theory where it is essential
to have utility functions? Since when does the US have
a utility function? “Oh,” I said, “that’s nothing. Abram
Bergson has written on this type of thing.” “Oh,” he said,
“would you write an exposition of this?” Well that was
the thing that led to the social choice book.
(quoted in Feiwel 1987, p. 193)
RAND tried to attract scholars of competence equal
to that of academic stars but perhaps with generally
less gaudy credentials, a greater penchant for intellec-
tual risk taking, and a modicum of intellectual chutzpah
that encouraged working outside the bastions of one’s
own disciplinary credentials. Outstanding minds were
attracted to the combination of interesting ideas and
interesting problems. They often worked in teams across
disciplinary specializations. Charles Lindblom recalled
how he was “enormously stimulated by and pleased” to
see much higher interaction among researchers than on
any university faculty he had ever seen.11 He also noted
that there was an openness and curiosity and desire to
learn: “At RAND the ease of intellectual interchange
and the frequency of it seemed to be very, very high,
compared with Minnesota, and Yale. I thought that was
very heady stuff, and these people were, I thought, think-
ing sharply, pertinently. Although they loved to argue,
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were learning from each other and they liked to find
a new idea rather than to fight it off as a challenge
to their correctness.”12 This was from Lindblom’s early
period at RAND in the early 1950s. A few years later,
he wrote an analysis for Hitch on the declining trends at
RAND (anticipating what others such as Marshall and
Schlesinger would later see as major barriers to RAND
as a place for strategic thinking).
High intellectual capabilities and the ambition to be
first combined to stimulate an attraction to high-variance
options, particularly among those who were not among
the academic “chosen.” It did not, of course, guarantee
that any particular outlier direction would succeed, but
it produced clusters of ambitious intellectual risk tak-
ers who gained further stimulus by finding themselves
among kindred spirits.
Any propensity for intellectual exploration was con-
tinually threatened by its poor prospects of early success
and by the inclination of institutions to punish fail-
ure. The administrative system depended on exceptional
administrative finesse. Robert Specht noted, “Flexibility
and competitiveness and some apparently looseness in
organization in general are important assets in pro-
moting an imaginative search for new ideas and new
relations 0 0 0 0 The search for a proper balance between
too much order and organization and too little—this
search is one that is unending and to which we are not
to expect a simple and definitive solution” (Specht 1958,
p. 2).
A former vice president of RAND, Joseph Goldstein,
described the complications of administering RAND
projects:
How do these RAND projects start? A one-man project
often starts with one man who has an idea 0 0 0 it is possible
for someone to pick up the ball and run with it—so long
as it is an inexpensive ball that he is running with. We can
and must afford small projects of the one-man-off-in-a-
corner type with little or no administrative review in their
early stages. Many of these die aborning; others become
productive projects and may either remain one-man ven-
tures or may expand into larger and more expensive
undertakings. In the latter case, the problem of allocating
our limited supply of manpower becomes a more difficult
one, and management at some level becomes involved.
The administrator has not only the difficult task of admin-
istering research, but also the equally difficult and impor-
tant job of refraining from administering.
(Goldstein 1961, p. 4)
In its early years, RAND became a home for intel-
lectual refugees, imaginative people whose ideas may
have not found a comfortable home in the establishment.
RAND often paid slightly better salaries than did aca-
demic departments; but at least according to self-reports,
the people who came to RAND were attracted more to
the freedom and intellectual excitement than the wage.
Shapley recalled, when asked about his unusual hiring
early at RAND, “RAND had anomalies. RAND was
itself anomalous at that time.”13 He further recalled that
his first impressions were the openness and the intellec-
tually interesting problems: “I’m not all that disciplined
in getting places on time or going to bed when I should
so that I can get up when I should. And RAND is sort
of nice—it’s open all the time, twenty four hours. Peo-
ple work at night, late, and you can just go in there.
The other part was that there’s enough interesting here
to do. At that time [in 1948], the mission of RAND was
very open 0 0 0 0 The military felt that 0 0 0we should keep
in touch with the scientists after the war.”14 A similar
spirit has been noted in other sites for intellectual out-
liers. Hiltzik (2000) noted, for instance, that researchers
at the Palo Alto Research Center of the Xerox Corpo-
ration were attracted by “the thrill of pioneering,” and
one of them compared it “to the sheer joy of making the
very first footprints in a field of virgin snow” (p. xx).
Shapley argued that it was the relative intellectual
freedom that (1) enabled the collection of outstanding
outlier minds and (2) allowed them to pursue their ideas
with minimal direction. He described the spirit as being
“give them some money and say, ‘you think of some
problems and tell us about it.’ 0 0 0This led to people
like Williams putting together a rather motley crew of
people. He hired philosophers. 0 0 0And he hired crazy
students from the math departments—me.”15 Marshall
recalls that Shapley would work during the nights and
sleep during the days without censure from RAND exec-
utives. Barlow, an early engineer, also recalled how intel-
lectual freedom became a major factor in attracting good
minds to RAND: “One unusual feature is that RAND
insisted right from the start on complete intellectual
freedom.”16 It is, of course, somewhat misleading to say
that “RAND insisted” when the primary dynamics came
from the recruitment of an interlocking group of intel-
lectual activists who believed in the essential necessity
of intellectual freedom for scientific development. The
recruitment encouraged a culture that was then solidified
by the mutual support of the principal actors.
Some of the ideas they worked on early on were seen
as “wild” then but are now almost taken for granted.
As Augenstein, an early RAND aeronautical engineer,
noted,
I think I myself and a lot of other people were attracted to
RAND because it had a reputation, even in its infancy, of
being considered wild or outrageous or too far removed
in time or at great many other considerations, where ideas
like that would not only be entertained by they could
be developed. And I think that was really kind of the
trademark at RAND, in the first decade or two that it
was in existence. Many ideas which we take for granted
today were quite outrageous 30 or 40 years ago.17
Managers such as Williams and Hitch protected the
mavericks. Enthoven (1995) mentioned how Hitch, then
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people to think outside the box and stick their necks
out. As the leader of the group, he was prepared to take
any heat that might come from deviant ideas so that the
scholars were protected and could continue their work.
Although one cannot attribute RAND’s (or any other
organization’s) success to a few individuals alone, indi-
viduals do matter, and Hitch is an example.18 Both in
his writings and in his management of the economics
department at RAND, Hitch was an organization man.
His understanding of the key role of organizations was
present in his early critique of marginalist pricing (Hall
and Hitch 1939). But even more impressive was his
awareness of the dynamics of organization, evident in
his building the economics department at RAND, the
systems analysis group at the Pentagon, and the Uni-
versity of California. His manners and modesty, as well
as his ability to collect people socially (often gathering
groups together for dinner and wine at his house), con-
tributed to good people being attracted. And once there,
they trusted his leadership. He also had a reputation for
uncompromising academic and intellectual integrity. For
example, he resisted having senior researchers affix their
names to reports prepared by their juniors.
The result was an unusual openness to novel ideas.
For example, game theory was welcomed and housed in
RAND before it was respected academically (Mirowski
2002). As early as 1946, Ed Paxon, a RAND engi-
neer, discussed with von Neumann the application of
von Neumann’s and Morgenstern’s ideas to naval tac-
tics, and Paxon found it potentially illuminating for dif-
ferent types of conflict.19 Evolutionary economics, too,
had a significant presence at RAND in the 1950s. Some
other ideas that were nurtured ultimately became suc-
cessful as academic subjects, sometimes with consid-
erable delay. These included ideas pursued at RAND
in the 1950s about vacancy chains (White 1970), artifi-
cial intelligence (Simon 1991, Newell and Simon 1972),
linear and dynamic programming (Bellman 1984), and
organization theory (Flood 1951). RAND scholars also
made pioneering contributions in early space studies
(Hall 1963).
Other RAND-stimulated ideas never took hold in
mainstream academic scholarship but secured some
attention in policy circles. For example, Leites’ oper-
ational code analysis was valued by some policymak-
ers and strategists (Marshall 1989, Schlesinger 1989).
Rowen noted that Leites’ 1951 book The Operational
Code of the Politburo was “one of the most influen-
tial books to me.”20 However, Leites’ ideas never gener-
ated much following from traditional academic scholars
(George 1969). RAND also was where the intellec-
tual foundations for net assessment were developed by
Marshall (Augier 2013). Systems analysis and defense
economics gathered some traction in academic circles
but never made an appreciable impact on the core of
economics.
The imposition of secrecy at RAND occasionally
allowed deviant work that was not exposed to serious
academic criticism to proceed. The result was a certain
tendency toward sustaining ideas of limited merit, but
it also shielded possibly useful deviant ideas from pre-
mature scorn. As has been observed in several contexts,
nurturing novelty often requires protective boundaries
around new ideas, boundaries that allow both brilliant
deviance and nuttiness to resist the forces of conven-
tional knowledge. Most organizations are more respon-
sive to the costs of protecting nuttiness than they are to
the benefits of protecting brilliant deviance. The costs of
nuttiness are real, however, and the (early) RAND strat-
egy of openness to ideas incurred the undoubted cost of
protecting some inferior ideas from rigorous review.
Sometimes there was a tension between a culture of
free inquiry and Air Force clients. For example, one of
the early projects that engaged Rowen at RAND (under
Wohlstetter) was the Strategic Base Study (1951–1954).
The team was to identify the important factors in strategic
air base selection and evaluate alternative basing systems
according to performance. The study used systems analy-
sis and focused on cost effectiveness/economic efficiency
arguments. The decisions examined involved trade-offs
between factors such as logistics, proximity, and rela-
tive vulnerability to enemy attack. The study concluded
that the Air Force’s strategy had significant weaknesses
and put the United States in danger of a Soviet preemp-
tive surprise attack. A few years later, a classified study
by Enthoven made similar conclusions. These studies
were clearly facilitated by RAND’s intellectual permis-
siveness, but they antagonized important elements of the
institution’s Air Force clientele.
Recruitment of Intellectual Cronies
Groups of intellectual deviants were gathered together
by exploiting friendship associations and other personal
relations. Persons who had previously been known to
each other and who had been recognized as being smart,
energetic, and imaginative were recruited on the basis
of previous associations. For instance, Enthoven recalls
how he was invited by Rowen to speak with Hitch,
the (then) head of the economics department, who then
invited him to work at RAND (only a few years ear-
lier, Hitch had also invited Rowen to work there based
on a personal introduction to Rowen by RAND engi-
neer Augenstein, who knew Rowen’s wife).21 Hitch him-
self had been recruited by Williams, who he knew from
Oxford. Williams also was responsible for hiring Helmer
to work at RAND (and before that, he hired him to work
for the Statistical Research Group). Marshall was hired
by Goldhamer based on the recommendation of Wallis,
with whom he had worked at the University of Chicago.
Arrow was hired on the basis of recommendations from
Wallis and Girshick. Alchian was hired by Wallis, who
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in charge of hiring several other economists, including
Enke (who had just left the University of California,
Los Angeles (UCLA)).
Leites was hired by Williams after having served with
the Office of War Information and the Foreign Broad-
cast Intelligence Service during the war, where he had
met Speier. He also knew Lasswell, who was involved
in the early social science conference at RAND. Kahn
was hired based on recommendation by Samuel Cohen,
a former Los Alamos physicist whom Kahn had known
since high school. Wohlstetter, another early person, was
recruited when he, “in a stroke of luck,” ran into Gir-
shick, Helmer, and S. C. McKinsey on the street in Santa
Monica, where he was intending to set up a factory.22
Most (if not all) of these informal hires would have dif-
ficulty making it through a standard hiring review today
in a big organization such as RAND. It was a mix of
individual connections with evolving institutional link-
ages including a connection with the UCLA economics
department (e.g., Enke, Alchian, Hirschleifer) and the
University of Virginia (Schlesinger came from Virginia
to RAND where he was assigned to be Marshall’s
assistant).
The process is one that can, of course, lead to groups
of friendly incompetents; but since the criteria of
“belonging” were criteria that emphasized intelligence,
imagination, openness, and the willingness to work hard,
crony recruitment proved to be an effective route to
creating a group at RAND that had impatience with
mediocrity and worked very hard (Williams 1962, p. 5).
Discussing what attracted people to the hot groups at
Carnegie and MIT, Leavitt noted the attractor that inno-
vative environments can be. He said, “Why did people
want to stay at those places and others want to join? Cer-
tainly not because Cambridge and Pittsburgh had mild
winters 0 0 0 0 It was the pull of the work and the accom-
panying sense of all-out involvement, with others, in
something active, fast, innovative, and worthwhile 0 0 0 0
Periods in our lives that stretch us beyond our imag-
ined limits are almost irresistible. It’s much like being
in love” (Leavitt 1996, p. 291).
The recruitment of intellectual cronies facilitated col-
laboration by ensuring the mutual trust that sometimes
requires years of talking and socializing. The RAND
clusters rather quickly exploited their prior acquain-
tanceships to produce remarkably effective heteroge-
neous work groups. The informal, personal style of
recruitment found at RAND in the early days was also
characteristic of other centers of intellectual outliers. For
example, Simon recalled the informality of staffing deci-
sions at the Graduate School of Industrial Administra-
tion of the Carnegie Institute of Technology (see Augier
2001). Wallis reflected on the extent to which the hiring
practices at the Statistical Research Group (Wallis 1980,
pp. 324–325) worked through friendship and collegial
networks: “Recruiting was by the old-boy network pure
and unabashed: no advertising, no competitive examina-
tions, and no attention to race, sex, age, physical hand-
icap, or apparent nationality or surname” (Wallis 1980,
p. 325). Modern examples include many start-ups in the
computer software world and the creation of clusters of
“hackers.”
Facilitation of the Combinatorics of Variety
RAND thrived by mixing backgrounds, talents, and
disciplines in ways that were not characteristic of
more traditional centers. A RAND conference in 1947
intended to explore the organization’s involvement
with more social sciences included sociologists (e.g.,
Speier, Herbert Goldhamer, Bernard Berelson, Frederick
Mosteller), psychologists (e.g., Donald Marquis, Ernst
Kris), anthropologists (e.g., Ruth Benedict), economists
(e.g., Hitch, Wallis, Alchian, Jacob Viner), political sci-
entists (e.g., Lasswell, Leo Rosten), and mathematicians
(e.g., Weaver) in addition to the usual suspects. Herbert
Goldhamer remarked during the conference that before
this effort to get into social science more seriously,
“RAND had been tentatively circling around a rather
vast ocean and getting its toes wet” (RAND 1948).
In his opening remarks to that conference, Weaver
observed, “One of the nice things about this job
[at RAND], at least one of the things that I am awfully
happy about, is that you let somebody, whose back-
ground is originally that of an engineer and secondly
that of a mathematician, into a room with 0 0 0 a num-
ber of social psychologists and political scientists and
economists. That is, I think, an indication of the direction
in which we are moving” (quoted in RAND 1948, p. 9).
Williams (1961) saw RAND as an institutional device for
“overcoming the increasing compartmentalization and
specialization of knowledge” (p. 2); and Lindblom noted
that with regard to interdisciplinary interaction, RAND
was better than universities: “It was a real community
of ideas.”23
As in most adaptive systems, a primary source of nov-
elty in ideas at RAND was the combination of disparate
elements. In many ways, combinations were dictated
or at least informed by the problems addressed (Simon
1986; see also Williams, quoted in RAND 1948). The
problems of warfare and security did not reliably respect
disciplinary boundaries (Williams 1950). It was always
challenging to get disciplines to talk together, but the
focus on problem-driven research led naturally (if not
inevitably) to an emphasis on combining multiple disci-
plines in pursuit of possible solutions. This was partly
because urgent problems made disciplinary minds less
“territorial.”24 Wohlstetter mentioned the importance of
people being “seduced by a problem”—seduced away
from their “normal” disciplinary background to inter-
act with others with different perspectives.25 At the
same time, tendencies toward interdisciplinarity were
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that encouraged multidisciplinary explorations through-
out the social sciences. The mood of the times was both
reflected and influenced by the number of interdisci-
plinary committees and groups around institutions such
as the University of Chicago and the Ford Foundation
(Augier and March 2011, Chapters 4 and 6). Whereas
they differed in focus, they were united in emphasiz-
ing how multiple disciplinary perspectives could help to
solve contemporary problems and to assist in the devel-
opment of social science.
The problems that RAND addressed were to some
extent inherently multidisciplinary, but there were also
more mundane factors that contributed to the effective
combinations. First among these was the intellectual
freedom of the institution. As mentioned earlier, RAND
provided a context of considerable scholarly freedom.
Both the organizational hierarchy and the intellectual
hierarchy were deemphasized. Nobel Prize winners were
not given automatic precedence over graduate students
in discussing ideas. Similarly, at the Graduate School
of Industrial Administration of the Carnegie Institute
of Technology, students worked alongside professors;
ideas mattered more than titles. The RAND welcome
pamphlet for employees in 1957 proudly trumpeted the
organization’s lack of hierarchy in the note “Welcome
to RAND”:
You may have noticed already that the lines of authority
are not as rigidly drawn here at RAND as is usual in
most organizations. We like it that way, and we hope you
will too. The fewer controls the better, we think, and the
more each individual acts on his own responsibility the
better. Maybe one reason why this atmosphere prevails is
that RAND’s work calls for originality and initiative; our
products are ideas, and neither the ideas nor the way of
producing them fit into repeating patterns.26
The perceived urgency of the problems facing the
country seemed to make disciplinary minds less rigid.
Williams was a key force in breaking down disciplinary
boundaries. He himself had been trained in theoretical
astronomy but had also studied mathematics at Princeton
before heading the Applied Mathematics Panel’s Statisti-
cal Research Group at Columbia working on operations
research problems in battles. Initially fascinated by mili-
tary worth and mathematical theories of warfare, he was
also early to recognize the need for other disciplines.
Williams was less concerned about the possible fric-
tions between the disciplines or their internal hierarchy
than the need to be able to understand real-world issues
in all their complexity and detail; nor did he find his own
background limited by his own embrace of other per-
spectives. His vision extended to the social sciences. In
1946, he put together a group to discuss military worth
as well as to build up skills at RAND with scholars
such as Wallis (economics), Herbert Goldhamer (soci-
ology), and Rosten (sociology), and he also recruited
scholars such as Mosteller and Helmer. Williams’ enthu-
siasm for broadening the disciplines involved was evi-
dent in the 1947 social science conference as well. He
asked anthropologist Mead to participate in an early
project. Williams, in looking back, recalled that she had
a “shocked look on her face” when “she learned that
working for RAND involved working for the Douglas
Aircraft Company” (Bornet 1962, p. 34). Mead, how-
ever, did agree to work for RAND.
In the early days of RAND, architecture and the prob-
lem focus facilitated the mixing of disparate talents.
RAND was built around patios that served as meet-
ing places for individuals who would not ordinarily
meet; the design of the buildings inviting interdisci-
plinary and unusual contacts. A key architect behind this
arrangement was Williams, who was well aware of the
importance of physical context for intellectual content:
“RAND represents an attempt to exploit mixed teams,
and that to the extent its facility can promote this effort
it should do so. This implies that it should be easy and
painless to get from one point to another in the build-
ing; it should even promote chance meetings of people”
(Williams 1950, p. 7).27
Underlying the importance of such chance meetings
was an awareness of the way organizations can facili-
tate interpersonal conversations: “I think one of the least
publicized facts about human organization is the extent
to which personal contacts are important—particular to
successful organizations—and the extent to which one’s
personal knowledge and the confidence one reposes in
a person is transferable” (Bornet 1962, p. 30). Thus the
RAND office buildings were explicitly designed to keep
people mixed in unusual ways. Offices were oriented to
patios in the inside of the buildings rather than outside
corners, somewhat reversing the prestige of outer versus
inner offices. Williams (1950) observed, “If a multiple
patio scheme were artfully done, it would develop that
‘outside offices’ [i.e., the ones overlooking the beach] in
the normal sense, would rank low in popularity” (p. 7).
The power of architecture and organizational struc-
ture on interaction is seen in the exceptions. Some of
the work that physicists did required a variety of secu-
rity clearances that necessitated a separate door between
their work area and the rest of the organization, thus
minimizing interaction. The social science department
was first located in Washington, DC, away from the main
headquarters of RAND in Santa Monica. Its interactions
with other disciplines were small until it relocated to
Santa Monica.
Physical proximity is important, but it is not enough.
The generation of contact is inhibited by a very gen-
eral mechanism of variety limitation—homophily, the
tendency of elements to congregate with other similar
elements. Homophily operates at two levels: First, an
institution recruits and retains individuals who are sim-
























































Augier, March, and Marshall: Perspective
Organization Science 26(4), pp. 1140–1161, © 2015 INFORMS 1151
Second, individuals within an institution establish and
maintain workgroup contact with people similar to them-
selves more commonly and more easily than with
dissimilar people. Homophily at either level serves to
discourage the combination of disparate elements. If an
institution as a whole has little variety, any mixing rules
in the formation of workgroups will bring similar ele-
ments together in workgroups. If an institution as a
whole is heterogeneous, homophilic formation of work-
groups will tend to result in workgroups without inter-
nal variety, and thus meager combination of disparate
elements.
RAND seems persistently to have combined disparate
elements within workgroups. The combination of dis-
parate elements resulted in part from the fact that (for
some reason) a relatively heterogeneous pool of intel-
lectuals was recruited to the institution. At least in the
case of RAND, the intention was to get the best minds
trained in the disciplines, then induce them to work
across disciplinary lines, at least to a greater extent than
normal, often because the nature of the problems on
which they worked did not fit a single discipline—in
other words, RAND was multidisciplinary by design
(see RAND 1948). And it happened in part because
the process of workgroup formation was incompletely
homophilic, or homophilic with respect to a different
attribute (e.g., recreational preferences).
The pressures toward intellectual homophily did not
disappear. Given a choice, most of the scholars resid-
ing in these centers gravitated toward others who
shared their training, inclinations, ideas, and world-
views. Homophily undermined the intellectual culture at
RAND. Helmer commented on the latter-day difficulties
at RAND in getting dissimilar people to work together
as they had in the early days:
What I liked very much about the early days at RAND
0 0 0was the spirit of cooperativeness and openness 0 0 0
which was fostered very largely through John Williams
0 0 0he was instrumental in bringing in economists and
political scientists. But much to our distress, as time went
on, we found that among particularly the political sci-
entists, there was much more of the sort of academic
relative secrecy among them. They did not welcome the
idea, as much as we had done, of cooperating with peo-
ple in other disciplines. They were not intrigued with the
possibility of a multidisciplinary approach to problems.28
Tendencies toward homophily were affected by fea-
tures of the organization—partly deliberate, partly not.
In general, the smaller an institution in terms of the num-
ber of individuals involved, the harder it is to maintain
homophily in voluntarily forming subgroups. Large size
in the former facilitates homogeneity in the latter. If you
have 20 people representing six disciplines, it is hard
to find many groups of five that are monodisciplinary.
If you have 200 people representing six disciplines, it is
not hard to find groups of five that are monodisciplinary.
Some of the key projects at RAND manifestly de-
manded knowledge drawn from several disciplines, but
even where the requirements were ambiguous, the cen-
ters often proclaimed, and to some extent insisted on,
an ideology that defined the problems on which they
worked as necessarily multidisciplinary. Physicists could
prefer to work with other physicists, but they could not
declare that all problems of interest were problems that
involved only the knowledge of physics without encoun-
tering some elements of social disapproval.
As RAND grew, the importance of the physical archi-
tecture for RAND became evident, as noted by Specht
(1958, p. 2):
As John Williams said in 1950, “RAND represents an
attempt to exploit mixed teams, and to the extent its facil-
ity can promote this effort it should do so.” That is, at
RAND, much more than at a university, a physicist is apt
to encounter the political scientist, the engineer to con-
sort with the economist. This is true—and important—
not only in the formal work of an interdisciplinary project
team, but also in the many internal contacts, ones the
building design should stimulate. An expert in interna-
tional relations may write a book by himself, but he is
a different man and it is a different book because he
has been simulated and educated by encounters with col-
leagues of many disciplines and varied experience.
In the early years, both RAND and the workgroups
within it were small in numbers. The combinations
produced by interactions among a variety of different
people were encouraged by smallness. Because of the
small size, the ideology, the problem foci, and the work
arrangements, scholars worked, lunched, and had offices
in arrangements and across projects that led to numerous
casual contacts that violated homophilic rules.
Speculating About the Seeds of Decline
RAND exhibited a period in which exceptional clusters
of intellectual imagination thrived, followed by subse-
quent decline. To some extent, of course, such fluctu-
ations are simply one more instance of regression to
the mean. The random processes that produce outliers
necessarily produce a tendency toward their subsequent
decline from earlier intellectual excitement.29
Regression to the mean is a necessary product of ran-
dom sampling, but it is not a necessary product of behav-
ioral causality. When behavior is taken into account,
decline is not a necessary aftermath of success. There
are numerous situations in life in which human behav-
ior results in the amplification of random events. For
example, early scientific successes color the assessment
of subsequent contributions by the same scientists. Indi-
viduals who are described as leaders have their behav-
iors subsequently seen as leader-like more often than
those not so labeled. People who are successful develop
























































Augier, March, and Marshall: Perspective
1152 Organization Science 26(4), pp. 1140–1161, © 2015 INFORMS
future success more likely. In the present case, it would
not be surprising to discover that individuals and organi-
zations that are recognized as producing successful intel-
lectual outliers might subsequently be seen indefinitely
as leading sources of innovation. They might attract
scholars who longed for challenge and high-variance
alternatives for their research. Reputations might feed on
themselves.
Similarly, although regression to the mean is undoubt-
edly a factor, there may be behavioral and organiza-
tional mechanisms that either moderate or contribute to
decline. On the one hand, a reputation for positive out-
liers facilitates the recruitment of talent. At the same
time, however, it appears to be true that the flaring of
intellectual outliers involves the stimulation of intellec-
tual variety, but successful variation inhibits the fur-
ther generation of variety. Successful intellectual outliers
become the basis of a new intellectual orthodoxy. Varia-
tion is self-defeating, particularly when its success leads
to hubris and arrogance, and arrogance has been reported
as typical in many groups that have produced intellectual
outliers (for example, Leavitt 1996).
We consider three major organizational consequences
of achieving success with intellectual novelty: suc-
cess yields a sense of competence, it yields endurance
in a competitive world, and it yields the opportunity
and inclination to grow. Self-confidence, endurance, and
growth produce numerous positive consequences for an
organization, but for the most part, they undermine vari-
ety. Since success produces all three—self-confidence,
endurance, and growth—it is not easy to separate the
variation reduction effects of one consequence from
the effects of the others; but collectively, they tend to be
overpowering.
Self-Confidence
The self-confidence that comes from success reflects
the attribution of outcomes to personal or organizational
qualities. Good outcomes that are due to some mix of
capabilities and luck are attributed primarily to the for-
mer or to some personal access to luck. As a result,
success leads to overconfidence and to limitations on
self-criticism (Lindblom 1959, Whitehead 1925).
Overconfidence and limitations on self-criticism have
positive effects on variety insofar as they lead to an
underestimation of risk. Successful managers are inclined
to take risks because they have learned (in part, erro-
neously) that the risks do not apply to them (Kahneman
and Lovallo 1993). However, success leads not only to
overconfidence about risks but also to overconfidence
with respect to the actions that have been associated with
success. Successful actors tend to repeat actions that were
associated with past successes and to avoid other possi-
bilities (Denrell and March 2001). They become seduced
by invitations to give advice, invitations that lead them to
place greater emphasis on usefulness than on creativity.
As RAND members became convinced of the dan-
gers of the international situation and the usefulness of
their ideas, they sought influence: “Faced 0 0 0with a feel-
ing of emergency in national defense policy, if not some-
times with a foreboding of catastrophe, many RAND
members want[ed] a more immediate and comprehen-
sive kind of influence” (Lindblom 1959, p. 16). How-
ever, seeking influence tended to undermine the bases of
influence. Among other things, seeking influence leads
to biases and narrowness of minds, which itself under-
mines real influence; few, however, can resist the desire
to be “relevant” and make policy decisions (as opposed
to understanding decision making in policy situations).
In addition, involvement in making decisions inevitably
leads to sharing sentiments with decision makers, thereby
reducing the autonomous role of independent thinkers.
The importance of understanding decisions, not mak-
ing them, is also emphasized by Williams (1961): “It is
important that RAND’s role in government be that of
advisor at most; much of it is in fact that of precursor
and catalyst 0 0 0 it must not accept managerial and deci-
sion making responsibilities” (p. 10). Wohlstetter felt
that RAND declined because it became more like a con-
sulting firm and less like an intellectual institution with
subsequent decline in “its willingness to take risks, and
its disposition to think up alternatives that were likely to
meet opposition at a time when ideas are tentative and
vulnerable.”30 Relevance, of course, also leads into the
pitfalls of public policy and politics. When key mem-
bers of the RAND global strategy elite (e.g., Hitch,
Rowen, Enthoven, Ellsberg) became part of the Kennedy
administration—involved in not only politics but Demo-
cratic politics—it led to disquiet at RAND and among
its Air Force sponsors.
Part of this may have to do with the degree to which
researchers interacted with their “customers.” Lindblom
(1959) argued that basic interdisciplinary, empirically
driven research seems to be most influential when it
does not seek influence, most powerful when it does
not seek power. He noted that if one seeks influence on
policy, then one is more likely to ignore, consciously
or not, contributions from disciplines and perspectives
other than one’s own and less likely to understand the
issues. It was a sentiment echoed in other studies of
innovative centers of research (Gehani 2003, p. 50).
Self-confidence leads to replicating specific successful
actions, not a strategy of variety that led to discovery
of those actions. At RAND, for example, confidence in
systems analysis led to a narrowing of minds; increas-
ing unwillingness to understand the full complexity of
the problems that were supposed to be illuminated; and,
over time, an arrogance that the conventional method
could apply to most, if not all, problems of the world
(Lindblom 1959).
It is worth pointing out that the more thoughtful pro-
ponents of systems analysis were aware of the limi-
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pioneers for systems analysis but was also very articulate
about its limitations (Hitch 1955, 1958, 1960; Koopman
and Hitch 1956). Others who warned early about pos-
sible limitations included Herbert Goldhamer, Alchian,
Marshall, and Schlesinger (Alchian and Kessel 1954,
Alchian et al. 1951, Goldhamer 1950, Schlesinger 1973).
They argued that a blind application of systems analy-
sis without more systematic research on human behavior
was likely to lead to mistakes and that, as a result, the
tools and methodologies that may have helped illuminate
some decision-making processes in the national security
arena could not be unthinkingly extended to unrelated
areas (Schlesinger 1973). Goldhamer (1950) noted in his
paper on the “human factors in systems analysis” that the
systems analysis perspective was flawed without incor-
poration of research on human behavior. He launched
efforts in that direction, which ultimately became the
Systems Development Corporation. Other attempts to
include more research on human behavior included work
that Newell and others did on man–machine interactions;
others centered around a systems research laboratory
headed by psychologist John Kennedy.
To some extent, RAND was torn between an enthusi-
asm for systems analysis and a concern that researchers
would be expected to make it work in situations in which
they did not understand how to execute it. Both horns of
the dilemma sustained a narrowing of intellectual atten-
tion. The hubris about early discoveries led to a ten-
dency to diversify into fields for which the techniques
were less useful and with which RAND was less well
equipped to deal. RAND in a sense had developed its
own “competency trap”; it had become good enough
at systems analysis that analysts used the method in
situations in which alternative approaches (if similarly
developed) would have served them better. Later disci-
ples of systems analysis tended to overlook the crite-
ria, which had been central to Hitch’s original vision
for systems analysis (Hitch 1953). When Lindblom was
invited to RAND in 1954 to study the criterion prob-
lem, he grew increasingly frustrated with the way the
strong adherence to systems analysis biased the research.
The systems analysis perspective became influential in
the McNamara era of defense planning and budgeting in
America, although it (especially later) strayed quite far
from Hitch’s original vision and became detrimental to
the development of strategic thinkers despite its earlier
contribution to it (Marshall 1991). The (perceived) suc-
cess in systems analysis in the defense area stimulated
attempts to push and apply the methodology to other
areas as well. At the same time, worries about a possible
oversell of RAND’s capabilities in systems analysis led
to a focus not on new ideas but on refining and imple-
menting old ones.
Endurance
The endurance that comes with success leads to aging.
The impact of aging on organizations is well docu-
mented (Aldrich and Auster 1986, Lumsden and Singh
1990). Aging often has positive effects on mean perfor-
mance, but it has few positive effects on variety. Endur-
ing bureaucracies emphasize reliability through rules,
recruitment, and regulations. Aging organizations accu-
mulate procedurally reliable personnel. Over time, ambi-
tious and talented individuals leave an organization, and
a successful organization fails to eliminate the untalented
and unmotivated, leading to the accumulation of “dead-
wood” and a steady increase of red tape (DeWeerd 1959,
Lindblom 1959). Aging organizations develop routines
and stability in employment that are inimical to vari-
ety. Offices, divisions, relationships, and authority tend
to persist.31 By contrast, a young organization, though
hobbled by a lack of knowledge and experience, attracts
and cultivates flexibility, energy, and vigor.
The growth in the number of administrative person-
nel relative to researchers was noted in RAND manage-
ment committee meeting notes. A report to the trustees
in 1963 mentioned that, if each employee is classified as
either a researcher or a part of the administrative staff,
between 1951 and 1963, the proportion of researchers
had fallen from 51% to 39%, with the administrative
staff increasing from 49% to 61%.32 Lindblom’s (1959)
analysis of RAND, for example, warned that one of the
trends pointing to decline was the rise of an “administra-
tive class,” which pursued neither the long-term interests
of the organization nor the development of science and
ideas that researchers sought. DeWeerd’s (1959) anal-
ysis is shorter but reaches similar conclusions, espe-
cially about the increased presence of red tape that
he found. Writing about the attitudes of the RAND
administrative class toward the difficulties at RAND,
Lindblom observed, “They do not deny its decline but
instead explain why the decline should be accepted”
(p. 6). Augenstein noted that “bureaucratic encrustation”
had begun to set in at RAND by 1960.33 Goldhamer,
reflecting on 25 years of experience at RAND, observed
that the growth of an administrative class at RAND
crowded out the creative individuals. He strongly advo-
cated refocusing RAND around key individuals and not
trying to fit individuals into areas or topics decided by
administrators. These complaints about the expansion of
administration with its deleterious effects on imagination
tended, of course, to ignore the administrative necessities
produced by RAND’s larger budgets and bureaucratic
visibility.
Growth
From 1948 to 1962, RAND grew from 225 employees
and a budget of $3.5 million annually to 1,100 employees
and a budget of more than $20 million.34 In many cir-
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a clear marker of success (and initially, at least RAND’s
growth was a result of success (DeWeerd 1959, p. 14).
Thus Lindblom recalled that when he presented to the
RAND president his words of caution that they should
probably try to stay small, he was met with the com-
ment, “We have to grow!”35 The growth that comes with
success has numerous favorable consequences for perfor-
mance, but it is not good for stimulating variation. By
extending the organization beyond a face-to-face group,
growth encourages self-interest more than group interest.
It mandates efforts to elaborate rules and regulations that
standardize activities and reduce variety. Growth leads
to the diversification of applications of what is known,
rather than diversification of solutions. Organizations
tend to apply their successes to new areas rather than
to generate new directions. Growth undermined a criti-
cal feature of intellectual variety—the cross-fertilization
of irrelevant contacts. It facilitated specialization and a
narrow focus, rather than the combinatorics of multi-
ple viewpoints. Growth necessitated the expansion of
administrative offices, which encouraged the substitution
of bureaucratic ambition for technological or intellectual
ambition. Growth also inhibited the practice of infor-
mally recruiting really bright, but deviant, individuals
(and building research programs around their interests).
The larger organization tended to hire people who con-
formed to conventional disciplinary templates and fitted
a predefined research agenda (Goldhamer 1972, p. 1).
Thus, a major threat to RAND’s uniqueness as a cen-
ter for intellectual cross-fertilization and the sustenance
of deviants came not from failure but from success.
As the ideas associated with system analysis became
accepted both within RAND and outside, intellectual
deviants (e.g., Leites) had less and less contact with
the core activities of the organization. For a relatively
long period, such deviants continued to be acknowledged
as symbols of RAND’s heterogeneity and intellectual
excitement, but they increasingly became more tokens
of the ideology than important actors in the central intel-
lectual life of the organization.
Growth also made more difficult the interdisciplinary
collaboration that was so central in the early days.
A group of staff members at RAND took note of these
problems. One of their memos noted that
RAND’s most unique contribution, and its greatest
strength, lies in its success for handling work outside of
existing specialties. To continue to accomplish such ends,
however, requires maximum cooperation of RAND per-
sonnel within and between the various subdivisions of
RAND. With the passage of time we see departments
tending to become institutionalized, self-contained enti-
ties rather than administrative conveniences. Some even
show the desires of flourishing in splendid isolation. Our
concern is that such a trend can act in a manner detrimen-
tal to the successful accomplishment of interdepartmental
projects and goals.36
Growth also led to the multiplication of coordinating
groups, administration, and meetings. Speier noted,
Meetings of permanent bodies—committees, subcommit-
tees, advisory boards, etc.—are part of the formal com-
munications system. The more meetings of this kind are
held in an organization over a given time, the less healthy
is the organization 0 0 0 0 The more meetings in which a
person participates by preference or obligation, the less
he is likely to do or discuss matters of intellectual impor-
tance in or outside of meetings 0 0 0 0 The larger the num-
ber of persons participating in a meeting, the smaller the
chance that anything useful will be achieved in settling
issues.37
DeWeerd (1959) also noted that one of the signs of
decline in the late 1950s was the “industrialization” of
the administrative structure of RAND, as manifested,
for instance, in a “steady growth of red tape,” increas-
ing status symbols for administrative staff and grow-
ing emphasis on the packaging and merchandising of
research (rather than research itself) (p. 19).
In a grand sense, the processes are manifestations of
a fundamental mean/variance dilemma: what is good for
maximizing average performance (e.g., order, routiniza-
tion, tight controls, rules, unity, homogeneity) is bad for
maximizing variety; what is good for maximizing vari-
ety (e.g., disorder, spontaneity, loose controls, conflict,
heterogeneity) is bad for maximizing average perfor-
mance. For many good reasons, the typical small, young
organization is not likely to survive; the ones that sur-
vive will tend to be the ones that have, by brilliance
or luck, experimented with a good novel solution. But
the fortunate ones who survive the first stage will not
survive further unless they change to adopt characteris-
tics that undermine their inclination to produce variation.
An organization that continuously generates intellectual
outliers is imaginable only in a world where the pas-
sions of arbitrary interest are protected from the urge to
repeat success, a world that arguably would be hope-
lessly disoriented.
The closest thing to such an organization was prob-
ably the research university of the 20th century. Even
there, the tendency to repeat previous success was
strong. As universities gained recognition as centers of
research, they sought increasingly to imitate one another
and to repeat previous successes. By the 21st century,
there was a real risk that many North American univer-
sities had become sufficiently seduced by prospects for
immediately profitable collaboration with business enter-
prises such that they tended to abandon the real pursuit
of variety and originality while espousing its rhetoric
(Augier and March 2011).
The alternative to trying to imagine an organization
that continuously generates intellectual outliers is to try
to imagine a universe of organizations that do so collec-
tively. Suppose we concede that success inevitably under-
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small organizations that exhibit variety for awhile before
they either die (a likely event) or produce a successful
deviation (an unlikely but occasional event). In the latter
case, either success extinguishes their capability to gen-
erate variety or the competition extinguishes them. The
community requires a continual replenishment of high-
variance organizations that arise despite their negative
expected value. This requires, in turn, a system that con-
tinually produces a population of potential entrepreneurs
and investors who (for whatever reason) are inclined to
support low mean/high-variance foolishness.
The Engineering of Flaring
Realizing the benefits of intellectual outliers involves the
engineering of enduring institutions that produce them.
Historically, such institutions have been rare and short-
lived. The fundamental reason for the rarity of institu-
tions that produce outliers and for their short lives is
that outliers and the conditions that produce them are
not favored by their environments. Most crazy ideas are
crazy, and the same conditions that produce brilliant,
path-breaking new ideas produce a lot of cockeyed non-
sense. As a result, it is generally not sensible to encour-
age outliers. And if by some chance an outlier proves to
be valuable, it is generally more sensible to refine and use
that idea than to seek new outliers. RAND was a gamble
after the war. It was the kind of gamble that would nor-
mally be a losing one. Hitch (1958) noted that “research
seems to attract an optimistic breed” (p. 3). Against the
odds, RAND succeeded. Subsequently, the organization
declined as a source of new ideas, in large part because
it adopted policies that diminished variance. Outliers dis-
appeared, but RAND survived. Later presidents seemed
inclined to design for endurance, rather than variance.
Marshall and Schlesinger were actively engaged in
trying to help then RAND President Rowen to try to
reshape RAND in a direction that might (re)capture
its earlier spirit. But they also were very aware of
the difficulties. For example, Schlesinger wrote in a
memorandum38 to Rowen: “There is no good way to
structure RAND.” Comparing the choice of organization
either by discipline or by function or problem area, he
noted, “RAND has traditionally adhered to organization
by discipline. In the early days of the organization, with
greater internal flexibility, this structure did not necessar-
ily preclude a functional approach [i.e., problem-driven
research]. Unhappily, this can no longer be said to be the
situation.” He also emphasized both benefits (in terms
of keeping up with professional developments in the
disciplines) and costs: “Many RAND personnel remain
wedded to their disciplines in the narrowest sense, and
contribute remarkably little, to the understanding of the
big problems.” In this memorandum, Schlesinger linked
the narrowness to the lack of organizational flexibility:
With the erosion of internal flexibility and also the dis-
appearance of the centripetal force represented by the
universal concern with the threat posed by the Soviet
Union, RAND research efforts have become increasingly
fragmented. Partly for disciplinary reasons and partly
for more localized bureaucratic reasons the departments
likewise have increasingly become pools of power that
tend to resist attacking problems on RAND-wide basis.
Much departmental effort is not relevant to RAND’s main
objectives and represents only a casual effort to keep up
with what is going on in the separate disciplines.
Designing for interdisciplinarity is also difficult, yet
some things may help. Williams wrote, in the context of
discussing RAND’s self-criticism, “Effective interdisci-
plinary research requires singularly intimate intellectual
and personal relations. I haven’t a clue as to how to
achieve it invariably, or quickly. But it is like a marriage,
concerning which I know a theorem: Propinquity is a
prerequisite.”39
Creative energies can emerge from the interaction
of people from different disciplines—but such mixing
may run contra to most academics natural centripetal
tendency toward seeking likeminded and similar disci-
plinary minds. The problem is a classical one that has
been noted in many contexts: people learn most from
others different from themselves yet seek the company
of those who are similar to themselves.
The basic lessons from the RAND experience are clear.
They are also familiar. An adaptive system requires a mix
of exploration and exploitation. In the short run and near
neighborhood of the adaptive mechanisms, however, the
returns from exploitation and the costs of exploration are
greater (and more visible) than the returns from explo-
ration and the costs of exploitation. As a result, exploita-
tion is systematically favored by ordinary adaptation and
tends to drive out exploration.
Yet there is repeated evidence that exploration is
needed. In Weaver’s autobiography, he wrote,
The more serious and significant aspects of the progress
of science during my lifetime could, of course, only
be described in technical terms. To the trained scien-
tist, the significant advances are likely to be improve-
ments in complicated and abstract basic theories. These
improvements give the theories greater precision, broader
application, and increased aesthetic grandeur. These
improvements are often too technical and too abstract
to seem impressive to the non-scientist. But it is just
these deep and abstract improvements in basic theories
which 0 0 0 lead to the 0 0 0 improvements that touch and serve
everyone. (Weaver 1970, p. 135)
Engineering solutions to this problem are of four
types. The first type attempts to improve the rational-
ity of decisions by extending the time and space hori-
zons of decision makers so that the more distant benefits
of exploration are fully recognized in the analysis. The
second type attempts to lead decision makers to sup-
port exploration by providing false information about
the likelihoods of positive returns from exploration. The
third type attempts to buffer exploratory activities from
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protect exploration from analysis by connecting it to dic-
tates of identities.
Extending Time and Space Horizons
Research on time and space horizons in individuals has
focused on two fundamental individual problems that are
common though not universal.
1. Impatience: Individuals often seem to find it dif-
ficult to delay gratification, even under conditions in
which such a delay is almost certainly rational. They
prefer immediate, rather than delayed, reward, even
when the delayed reward is manifestly greater. They
avoid short-term pain, even when such pain is associated
with large longer-run benefits.
2. Self-centeredness: Individuals often are reluctant to
surrender rewards for the benefit of others or a larger
group that includes themselves. They focus on the self
rather than more extended groups and are likely to over-
look the indirect, diffuse benefits of belonging.
Organizations have similar difficulties. Former Secre-
tary of Defense (and before that, research scientist at
Los Alamos and Livermore Laboratories) Harold Brown
mentioned the “tyranny of the inbox” and the need to
be able to lift the perspective above day-to-day events
and “current problems” and have a longer perspective
(Brown 2012, pp. 16–17). He cited the need for organi-
zations to have a part or fraction of its best people be
devoted to long-term trends and issues.
The locus of organizational action is often more local
in time and space orientation than are the effects of
action. As a result, organizations tend to be myopic
(Levinthal and March 1993). Modern efforts to extend
time and space horizons of decision makers generally
seek to link incentives to distant horizons, for example,
through providing stock options that are realized only in
the long run. The results are mixed. On the one hand,
there appears to be little question that the possibility of
enormous future return motivates technological inven-
tors and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, there is some
question about the extent to which it motivates them to
engage in fundamental research or in projects having
indefinitely longtime horizons, and whether such moti-
vation reliably produces technological novelty.
Falsifying the Expected Returns
Most of life involves denying the reality that in the long
run, we are all dead and the species is extinct. It involves
constructing hopes in successes that are unlikely to be
fulfilled, embracing the triumphs of history as the central
story of history. Many more books are written about the
successes of research or business than are written about
the failures; yet most research yields modest results and
most businesses fail. Optimism about science was an
important aspect of RAND in the early years, but the
glories of progress celebrated in the mythic stories of
science are rarely replicated in research.
The falsifications come in two major ways. First, they
are embedded in deep beliefs about the long-run return
to science. There are very few basic research scientists
who fail to accept and recite some version of the litany
summarized in Flexner’s glib proclamation about the
usefulness of useless knowledge. They can easily offer
examples. However, it is a rare scientist who seeks to
gather any systematic data on the expected return to fun-
damental research.
Second, they come from the traditions of reporting sci-
entific results. Positive results secure much more atten-
tion than negative ones, particularly when the positive
scientific results are also connected to positive practical
consequences. The telling of scientific history is pro-
foundly biased by confidence in scientific success.
Buffering Exploration
Because its returns are uncertain and usually located
at a spatial and temporal distance from current activ-
ities, exploration tends to be vulnerable to efforts by
organizations to maximize expected return. To survive
and provide the more distant and less certain returns
that it offers, exploration needs to be buffered from
the ordinary organizational processes of efficiency seek-
ing. Excess resources (“organizational slack”) some-
times provide a buffer, a buffer that inevitably pays the
price of protecting the indolent and malevolent as well
as the imaginative, but it may, nonetheless, be useful
(Enke 1967).
When writing to Oppenheimer regarding the organiza-
tion of research at the Institute for Advanced Studies and
the recruiting of researchers for positions there in 1948,
von Neumann expressed a need for trust as a buffer pro-
tecting research:
I feel strongly that the basic principle should be this:
A research appointment is essentially a position of
trust, expressing the belief of the appointing group
in the appointee’s ability and desire to do produc-
tive research0 0 0 such an “expression of faith” should not
be a priori combined with strict legal and administra-
tive safeguards of its fullfillness or attempts at such
safeguards 0 0 0 0 I think the primary approach ought to be
one of nonintervention and of trust.
(quoted in Rédei 2005, p. 191)
RAND itself was such a buffer within the defense
establishment, a buffer that sought to make exploratory
work possible by making it invisible to the mavens of
bureaucratic efficiency. As RAND grew, there were still
occasional efforts to create some kinds of small “skunk
works” that were protected from normal bureaucratic
controls and pressures. For example, a strategic studies
initiative (first headed by Schlesinger and subsequently
by Marshall) was initiated. It was intended to have its
own budget and hiring processes, and it was created
to focus on some of the broader strategic issues that
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years (Enke 1967, p. 3). The effort attempted to shelter
from normal bureaucratic procedures a small amount of
research focused on such issues.
Substituting Identities for Incentives
Both by modern ideology and by experience, organi-
zations are creatures of incentives. Activities within an
organization are motivated and coordinated by the grant-
ing and withholding of incentives. The manipulation of
incentives is a primary tool of managerial direction.
Insofar as research workers are sensitive to incentives
controlled by management, management can control the
direction of research. Managerial control of research
ordinarily disadvantages exploratory research because
managerial incentives tend to emphasize immediate and
local returns. It is not that managers are malevolent but
that they are efficient. Research that is predicated on
managerial incentives will in numerous ways undermine
exploration.
Exploration protects itself from managerial incentives
by embedding itself in the demands of a research iden-
tity. The scholar is a scholar and does what a scholar
should do. Fundamental exploratory research that is seri-
ous is conducted for its own sake and in response to
a claim of a scientific identity. One of RAND’s most
fundamental disadvantages lay in its long-run effort to
exercise managerial incentive control over its research,
an effort that undermined the position of the norms
of autonomous research. This effort necessarily made
RAND less attractive to employees with strong funda-
mental research identities. RAND increasingly recruited
very smart people whose motivations were incentive
based rather than identity based—thus people who were
less inclined to seek autonomy than to seek ways to sat-
isfy their masters, people who sought financial rewards
and careers rather than contributions to fundamental
knowledge.
Closing
It is hard to learn from a single case, particularly when
most of the key features of the case are quite consis-
tent with the idea that the intellectual flaring observed
was simply a random anomaly and particularly when it
is hard to be entirely confident that the regularities we
observe are regularities in the phenomena rather than
simply shared prejudices of observers. Nevertheless, we
think some modest clues to the occurrence of intellectual
outliers can be extracted from the story of RAND.
Flaring seems likely to be produced by the interac-
tion of three distinct kinds of processes. The first is the
independent, simultaneous generation of ideas through
the imagination of individual scientists. Discovery is a
highly uncertain, low-probability process, so the simulta-
neous realization of discoveries by multiple scientists in
the same neighborhood is an extremely unlikely event if
the discoveries are independent. It is conceivable, how-
ever, that the likelihood of discovery by individual sci-
entists may be responsive to organizational conditions.
The second kind of process is the combinatoric con-
tagion of discovery, the way in which imagination in
one scientist is stimulated and transformed by contact
with the imagination or knowledge of suitably adja-
cent others. Under such circumstances, discoveries are
not independent, and the likelihood of flaring increases.
Organizations may encourage or discourage such con-
tagious processes, primarily by facilitating or inhibiting
contact among individual scientists.
The third kind of process is the emergence of cultures
of imagination, clusters of scientists bound together in
an ethos that expects and demands imagination. The way
in which cultures emerge from the history of a group
is not well understood, but it involves interaction, con-
sciousness of distinctiveness, and the formulation and
spread of mythic history.
All three processes seem to have been involved in
some parts of RAND in its early years, particularly in
the economics and mathematics departments. The orga-
nization encouraged autonomous imagination, interac-
tions that produced combinatoric contagion of ideas, and
the elaboration of myths of imaginative excellence. The
encouragement was, to some extent, conscious, reflect-
ing the judgment of leaders that all three needed to be
stimulated.
At the same time, the phenomena appear to have been
consequences of both a specific context and a specific
historical flow of events that were not in particular prod-
ucts of managerial intent. RAND created neither the
postwar milieu of patriotic optimism nor the explosion
of interest in a scientific social and behavioral sciences
that profoundly shaped the RAND of the 1950s. This
context surrounded many institutions without producing
significant flaring of intellectual outliers, so there appar-
ently were features of the RAND response to the con-
text that facilitated the flaring; but without the context,
it seems unlikely that such flaring would have occurred.
One of the more intriguing and puzzling features of
the RAND experience was the combination of a general
sense of compelling and urgent social needs along with
the encouragement of intellectual autonomy and free-
dom. The intense demands of the Cold War upon the Air
Force and upon strategic planners in the larger defense
establishment were a pervasive feature of life at RAND.
This was combined, however, at least in some parts of
RAND, with an equally pervasive pressure toward the
independent autonomy of individual scientists or groups
of scientists. RAND, particularly in the economics and
mathematics departments, implemented one of the oldest
and most difficult to implement axioms of imaginative
management: insist on enthusiastic commitment to the
objective but encourage free play of independent imagi-
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There were few people at RAND who questioned
that the Cold War was real or who denied the impor-
tance of the United States winning that war, but they
varied considerably in the ways they formulated that
problem and in the solutions they imagined; that vari-
ance in possible means was encouraged by the same
authorities who demanded wholehearted acceptance of
the goals. In some respects, it was the shared sense of
compelling goals that made the autonomy possible. Tol-
erance for independent ideas was built on a strong sense
of shared fundamentals. Deviant ideas were protected by
their authors’ belonging to a community of shared objec-
tives. When later in RAND’s development, the objectives
became less clear and less shared, deviance became less
tolerable.
Outbursts of new ideas are not “natural.” They vio-
late the strong tendencies of knowledge to feed on itself,
rather than outside sources, and the strong tendencies of
knowledge carriers to cluster with similar others and to
pursue personal advantage, rather than gains to knowl-
edge. Outbursts of intellectual outliers occur when these
tendencies are thwarted by combinations of factors dif-
ficult to anticipate though modestly susceptible to con-
trol. The outbursts produce experiences of personal joy
for those involved, followed by dismay that the experi-
ences were transient. Participants look for secret incan-
tations that will reproduce the magic but realize at last
that their contribution to the magic may have been more
ephemeral than they might wish. It is a lesson hard to
learn but possibly worth learning, for it teaches that the
wise manager may prefer to predicate innovation less on
hopes for its consequences than on an attachment to the
obligations of an identity.
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